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Fragments in Libeskind and Wittgenstein
  Rossen Ventzislavov 
Abstract
My paper explores the similar role that fragments play in
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and in Libeskind’s architecture. 
The fragment is an infraction of traditional linear approaches to
architecture and philosophy and thus affords an alternative
critical glimpse into the fabric of each respective field.  The fact
that some philosophy and architecture use this device and its
critical stance bodes well not only for the futures of the two
disciplines but also for the embattled connection between them.
 In my paper I try to show that the break with linearity
Wittgenstein and Libeskind engage in effectively replaces the
ivory towers of architecture and philosophy with texts that help
create novel conditions for mutual understanding and
appreciation. 
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1. Introduction
In this paper I will try to outline some continuities between the
philosophical method of the late Ludwig Wittgenstein and Daniel
Libeskind’s approach to architecture.  My entry point into this is
the idea that the works of both the late Wittgenstein and
Libeskind constitute a conceptual playing field where accidental
occurrences are as welcome as essential ones. While both of my
subjects seem prone to pursue unexpected theoretical and
material tangents, their doing so speaks of a different concept of
order rather than of a preference for absolute anarchy.  The fact
that the later Wittgenstein manages to say anything in
philosophy and that Libeskind’s theoretical meanderings have led
to the creation of tangible buildings testifies to the order I am
referring to.
The question of why this new type of order thrives in part on
fragments merits attention.  My preliminary answer is that,
when introduced intentionally, the fragmentary argument in
philosophy, quite like the fragmentary blueprint in architecture,
are tools used to externalize the inner workings of the
philosophical or architectural process.  The result is that the
philosophical problem and the architectural idea incorporate the
critical dimension the work affords into the work itself.  I see
this as a healthy development in both fields towards a self-
reflexivity that makes the relevant works at once more
communicative and harder to understand.  In this paper I hope
 to justify and elaborate on my answer and, through this, to
make a small contribution to the reinvigoration of philosophy’s
relevance for architecture.
2. Some general considerations
When one dwells on the crossroads of philosophy and
architecture, it is only natural to look not just for overlap but
also, hopefully, for a solid connection.  The possible answers to
the questions “What is architecture?” and “What is philosophy?”
make the demarcation of such a firm common ground a
challenging affair.[1]  For example, to  say that architecture is
different from philosophy on account of its utilitarian concerns is
to simultaneously inform and delimit.  There is no productive
way of thinking about architecture as essentially utilitarian, just
as it is not expedient to view philosophy as fully divorced from
material application.  The counter-examples to such possible
argumentative tangents are numerous enough to render the
tangents elastic at best. As to philosophy, it is enough to refer
to its often legitimate claim to a central role in the
advancements of science and society at large.  
An alternative way of approaching the difference is the idea that,
in architecture, material utility is always intentional while in
philosophy it is very often accidental.  This idea, however, relies
on traditional notions of the two practices that fail to bear on
most philosophy after Descartes and a great deal of architecture
after Le Corbusier. A third possible tangent is the belief that
while architecture aims at beauty, philosophy strives for truth. 
This particular argument, and specifically the claim that
architecture should be mainly concerned with aesthetics, is aptly
undermined in Karsten Harries’ paper “Philosophy and the Task
of Architecture.”  Ultimately, the fact that architecture and
philosophy so often and so maniacally oscillate between
theoretical beginnings, formal concerns, and practical ends,
instead of settling on the traditional unidirectional progression
from theory to utility, with a secondary undercurrent of
aesthetic consideration, speaks to the common ground between
the two practices, but not enough. 
Instead of exploring the respective sine qua non conditions of
philosophy and architecture to find the overlap within them, I
have chosen to turn to a shared feature that has historically
been anything but essential for the existence of each practice. In
fact, the feature in question seems to militate against most of
philosophy and architecture as we traditionally know them. The
fragment—a device of expression used to subvert
argumentative, aesthetic, narrative, and material continuity—is
a good candidate for analysis because its intrusion into
philosophy and architecture is equally accidental.  By locating
the fragment as a common challenge, I hope to be able to
outline some notion of overlap that is heretofore unexplored.
After all, if a meeting ground should exist for architecture and
philosophy, it may be as likely to be found at the core as in the
perceived margins of each field.
There are a number of limitations to my study.  First and most
obviously, by drawing an analogy between an architect and a
philosopher, I risk misunderstanding the precise scope of the
intended comparisons.  I may partially alleviate this by
qualifying my understanding of fragments in a way that allows
for the concept to encompass disparate aspects of the respective
theoretical and material practices.  Second, my study is also
limited in that it does not tackle the differences between
architectural theory and architectural practice in the detail they
deserve.  This is partly because the particular architect I discuss
is, himself, fond of erasing the difference, but also because of
the constraints of my chosen format. Finally, many of my
conclusions will be a little hurried; they merit further illustration
and explication.  I hope that my general direction will be
inspiring enough for readers to pursue these tangents towards a
position of greater clarity.   
3. Fragment or whole?
Why the fragment?  It is important first to note that my
understanding of a fragment strays from the dictionary meaning
of the term.  Etymologically, the word is drawn from the Latin
fragmere, whose primary meaning is ‘to break.’  A fragment is
thus a piece or, strictly, a piece of debris.  This meaning of the
word fails to capture the nature of fragmentarity as I see it.
 First, in the primary sense there is the implication that a
fragment, be it already broken off or simply potentially
separable, always retains the mark of the whole:  it is a
fragment of something greater.  In this sense a fragment is
 necessarily incomplete and subordinate to the whole that
completes it.  Each piece of a jigsaw puzzle can thus be looked
upon as a fragment of the puzzle as a whole, every side of the
piece contoured so it fits into a general structural program.  But
it is clear that, while philosophical and architectural fragments
do often lend themselves to such subordination, they are just as
often able to resist the expected unity, their outer contours
suggesting alternative puzzles or none at all.  Second, the
primary meaning of the term differentiates between the essential
and the accidental. If a fragment is strictly subordinated to the
whole, then it is integral to it as a part of its essence.  This
would mean that fragments will be missed if they are,
perchance, broken off, but also that errant fragments cannot be
easily added to a perceived whole.  Again, this is very much at
odds with the accidental nature of the philosophical and
architectural fragments I will discuss. 
As a philosophical device, the fragment assumes the critical
responsibility to reveal and question the demand for logical
linearity.  Constructing an argument, be it syllogistically or in
any looser manner, usually involves a strict departure point
(wonderment, question, puzzle), an investigation (proof-finding
and proof-giving), and finally a destination (conclusion or
impasse).  A philosophical fragment would very often refuse this
structure in favor of a different kind of unity, one identified as a
“chaotic universality.”[2]  It is important thing to notice that
philosophical fragments do not neatly fit the dichotomy of whole
versus part.  While breaking up established unities or
universalities, they can piece up alternative ones.  If a fragment
did not communicate with other fragments, that is, if ‘fragment’
were not always used in the plural, it would have to instead be
read as an aphorism.[3]  The unity implied by such
communication, however, is decidedly not syllogistic or linear. It
is instead an opening through which linear arguments are
rendered as fields of argumentation, rational constructions that
conscript the disparate and often extraneous elements of a
context into the statements that the context is brought to
illuminate.   
In architecture, in turn, the fragment appears to endanger the
classical symmetry between concept and execution.  In the
emergence of an architectural plan, only considerations of site,
material, design and purpose are absolutely mandatory. The
process of arriving at decisions about these is, significantly, most
often left out of the final result.  This is not to say that creative
conceptualization is immaterial to the final product but only that
it is strictly subjected to the futuristic concerns of actual
construction.  In architecture, there is a strict temporal order of
before and after and, historically, success is measured by the
end product.  This criterion, however, has been challenged in
the architecture of the last century.  In the early work of Zaha
Hadid, for instance, the question “What if the architect designs a
building that cannot possibly be built?” fails to mount a reliable
normative critique.  In light of such work, the unbuildable is
shown, in many ways, to be as architectural as the already built.
In this challenge to the unity of before and after, plan and
execution, the fragment plays an important conceptual and
material role.  In the material sense, the fragment is an
architectural trope as old as architecture.  Any physical structure
can come apart, and our imagination reconstructs most that
have done so and then judges them on the evidence of the
remaining fragments.  This is explained by the fact that, at least
in traditional buildings, fragments are usually fully integrated in
the aesthetic/utilitarian purpose of the whole.  But this is true
only if we choose to accept the whole-versus-part dichotomy I
refer to above.  If we do not, there are ways of seeing
architectural fragments as ruptures in the homogenous body of
a building, that is, as self-standing commentaries on the
building’s place in the larger world of designers, builders, and
inhabitants.  My discussion of Libeskind’s projects will show that
such ruptures are not only conscionable but are already
available in the work of the contemporary architect.
Fragments also seem to dissolve the distinction between
essence and accident.  What is essential to a blueprint and the
possible building are the basic structural forms (point, line,
plane, and curve) and their particular aesthetic and technical
arrangement in alliance against the pull of gravity, the
obstructions of the site, and the demands of projected use.  A
fragment, if it manages to transcend the whole, is an accidental
feature.  This is not to say that accidents of this sort do not
themselves occur by design, but only that the design they serve
spills outside the boundaries of the particular blueprint/building.
 Therefore, if such fragments should ever come to exist in the
fabric of any edifice, accepting the accidental as essential in
architecture becomes a matter of scope. 
Looking back at the conceptual aspect of architecture, fragments
are even less bound by normative restrictions. The reason for
this is that, in conceptualizing a project, the architect is often
free to posit an edifice without having to commit to the crude
realities of one.  Such positing involves intangible factors, such
as the architect’s self-image, motivation to engage in the
particular project,  formal considerations, and social
entanglements, etc.  Again, these are as accidental to the final
result, if it ever materializes, as they are essential to it.[4] 
Based on these observations, the fragment becomes a good
candidate for the proper medium of the playing out of such
factors.
4. Libeskind’s fragmented philosophy
The architecture of Daniel Libeskind has been attacked on
account of its seemingly haphazard manner of conceptualization.
 In his essay, “Where Now the Architect?”, Neil Jackson
expressed such outrage by problematizing the perceived gap
between Libeskind’s theory and his built designs.  Jackson
focused on the practice of architectural critique and its ever-
changing subject.  He bemoaned a particular post-Modern shift
whereby architects choose to draw inspiration and insight from
philosophy instead of the history of architecture and its
illustrious classical examples.[5]  This made it difficult for
Jackson to analyze the architecture of someone like Libeskind as
architecture.  When viewing the final product of Libeskind’s
design of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, Jackson suggested that a
critic should focus on the building rather than on the arbitrary
idiosyncratic forces that conspired into its design.  What is at
stake here is the separation of these two aspects of the
architect’s work and the need to reinstate the primacy of the
end product.
Jackson, in fact, goes on to state that any functional critique of
Modern and post-Modern architecture, which has for the most
part been absent, should find continuities in the built work of
architects and not in their theories.  Still, what Jackson does not
seem to notice is that his own critical discontent with Libeskind’s
building, voiced without any elaboration, is a function of his
discontent precisely with the theoretical underpinnings of
Libeskind’s design process.  This misstep becomes possible on
account of Jackson’s insistence on the neat separation between
architectural theory and practice. In his defense, he cited from
Gropius, “The visual arts are being taught by historical and
visual methods of ‘appreciation’ and ‘information’ instead of
through direct participation in the techniques and processes of
making things” (Gropius’s emphasis).[6]  The focus on making
things and looking at things made misses the important point
that an architect’s web of appreciation and information is also a
thing made by the architect.  Furthermore, it is clear that none
of Libeskind’s buildings would be the way it is if it were not for
the influence of some relevant “immaterial” theoretical
modalities.
Jewish Museum in Berlin Façade 
It is, admittedly, easy to find cryptic expressions in the writings
of Libeskind and often in his buildings, too.  Most such
expressions fit the notion of fragmentarity discussed in Section 3
in that they subvert all manner of temporal and structural
linearity.  In Jeffrey Kipnis’s Preface to Libeskind’s The Space of
Encounter, he placed some of Libeskind’s work entirely outside
the tension between unity and fragmentation.[7]  Though Kipnis
does not explore the nature of the fragmentary or the
perception of it in Libeskind, he implicated “the haphazard
mixture of matter and events that constitute Daniel’s single life”
into the erasure of that tension.[8]  But even though this
erasure is understood to sweep through fragment and unity
alike, I think it is precisely the fragment that enacts the
haphazard intrusion of the architect’s life into his architectural
projects.
As to the specifics of Libeskind’s fragments, they are
emphatically autobiographical in two distinct ways.  The first is
presented through tangible points of contact, that is, invitations
into Libeskind’s life experiences in and outside of architecture.
For example, the musical notation sheets he used for the
presentation of his Jewish Museum in Berlin are a direct
reference to his earlier career as a professional and critically
acclaimed accordionist.  As he pointed out in his remembrance of
the actual presentation and its reception by the evaluating
committee, a conversation that was supposed to be about
architecture turned, on the pivot of Libeskind’s use of the
musical sheets, into a conversation about music.[9]  
A similarly autobiographical fragment, this time in the form of an
anecdote, appears in Libeskind’s proposal for the design of the
Felix Nussbaum Haus.[10]  In another project, entitled “Three
Lessons in Architecture:  The Machines,” Libeskind explores,
possibly via Le Corbusier’s famous pronouncement, the
architectural imperative to engage in making a machine. Midway
in what appears to be a standard theoretical exposition, he
abruptly switches to first-person narrative mode:  “We got up at
the crack of dawn, four o’clock in the morning.  We built the
machine in a small place without any power tools, just with hand
tools; with no electricity, just with candlelight.”[11]  Such
sudden digressions, even when directly involved with the
project, stand out as fragments of first-person narrative
immersion; while revealing something, they reveal someone,
that is, the architect at work.
Libeskind’s buildings, themselves, are no less dependent on
autobiographical references.  Based on his writings, it becomes
clear that the psychological condition of displacement that he
retained throughout his family’s relocations is a material
influence on his built projects. Therefore, it is safe to speculate
that this might be the condition that Libeskind’s architectural
voids attempt to comment on.  Another example of biographical
reference appears in the official informational release for the
unveiling of his Jewish Museum in Berlin, where Libeskind
confessed to being personally implicated in the architectural
program.[12]  The broken Star of David featured in the
building’s overall plan and in the numerous ruptures along its
façade can  be looked upon equally as an aberrant architectural
shape and an autobiographical fragment.   
Jewish Museum in Berlin Exterior Detail
The second way in which Libeskind’s fragments carry his
autobiographical stamp is by his liberal inclusion of all manners
of free association into the fabric of his proposals. When, for
example, Libeskind interrupts his exposition on machines to tell
the story of Cervantes’ gentleman and the eight books he
carried in his satchel, the central axis of the essay is temporarily
suspended.[13]  The Cervantes fragment, with its suggestion of
the virtues of intellectual asceticism, is only relevant to one of
the themes in Libeskind’s essay, and only so by implication.  In
other words, the unexpected reference demands not only the
reader’s attention but also involvement in decoding, together
with the author, the logic of the associative stream.  A multitude
of similar fragments appear in “Proof of Things Invisible,” a
lecture Libeskind gave at the Humboldt University in 1997. The
whirl of association here introduces references as disparate as
Nabokov’s description of a Berlin beggar, Einstein and Szilard’s
attempts at patenting a refrigerator, and the “English heritage
lodged in the honeycomb cells of the gigantic, brick clock called
London.”[14] 
It is through such disjointed inclusions that our appreciation of
each of Libeskind’s projects is routinely brought to question
itself—the discontinuous object of scrutiny suggests its own
explosive, non-linear manner of criticism. In fact, depending on
our readiness to personally engage Libeskind’s intricate
character and his fully externalized thought process, our reaction
to the works planned or built can fall anywhere between a sense
of intimate congeniality and what John Knesl has identified as
“formless despair.”[15]  
On the positive side of the scale, where all evaluating
committees that have green lit Libeskind designs have hopefully
stood, there is the strong sense that Libeskind’s vertiginous
prose and his disorienting buildings are a step forward in
architecture.  James E. Young proposed a defense of what is
identified, in a quote from Vidler, as “the intimation of the
fragmentary, the morselated, the broken.”[16]  Young
recognizes the infamous voids in Libeskind’s Jewish Museum as
a revolutionary way for architecture to engage the
visitor/inhabitant:  “They are not meant to instruct, per se, but
to throw previously received instruction into question.”[17]  If
this is even partially true, Libeskind should be given credit for
having cast in concrete the iconoclastic sense of wonder that
good philosophy casts in words.    
5. Wittgenstein’s architectural fragments
Wittgenstein’s is not the most prominent example of
fragmentary philosophy.  The title belongs to Nietzsche, whose
fragments have historically challenged and inspired a much
wider and more varied audience.[18]  However, there are two
reasons why the example of Wittgenstein is far better suited to
my purposes.  The first reason is that Wittgenstein’s
philosophical career admits of the same internal conflict that
characterizes the work of Libeskind:  they both are compelled to
reckon with and then refuse a paradigm of linearity. Where the
architect’s fragments, both in theory and practice, subvert the
traditional architectural understanding of utility and continuity,
Wittgenstein’s fragments from the Blue and Brown Books and
onward present a substantial challenge to the Tractatus’
compulsive order.  Wittgenstein is thus, quite unlike Nietzsche or
any other thinker, a philosopher where both meanings of the
fragmentary—the dictionary one and the alternative one I have
proposed—find their place at different times.
The second reason why Wittgenstein gains entry into my
discussion is the unique autobiographical dimension of his later
work.  As is the case with Libeskind’s “search” for each of his
buildings, from a certain point in Wittgenstein’s career, his
search for philosophical arguments gained a personal, even
confessional dimension.[19]  The analogy carries through the
two kinds of autobiographical intervention I have identified
above.  Just as with Libeskind, Wittgenstein’s later work is
replete with accounts of concrete personal experiences and a
wealth of intimate and fanciful mental associations.   
From the preliminary studies for his Philosophical Investigations,
and onward,  Wittgenstein’s prose favors what he identified as a
method of “sketches and landscapes” over traditional cohesive
argumentation.[20]  These sketches stand in sharp contrast to
his method in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, whose
numbered paragraphs add up to a veritable logical progression.
 The change in method is informed by a change in Wittgenstein’s
philosophical outlook. The philosophy of the Tractatus assumes
the viability of a procedure whereby our world can be mapped in
language with the help of logic.  A corollary of this is the belief
that philosophical problems can be discarded if they do not
conform to logic or can be solved if they do.  
Wittgenstein’s subsequent writings abandon this neat picture
altogether.  A recurrent motif in his late philosophy is the notion
of our bewitchment with language. The latter is invoked with
reference to our futile attempts, in and outside philosophy, to do
precisely what the Tractatus suggested we could do, that is,
map the world in language.[21]  This ambition and the
bewitchment thereof give way to a different concern, that of
mining the world and language for insight.  In this, however,
language and the world it hoped to capture are not taken to be
two separate entities in a symmetrical relation.  Instead,
language is recognized as a part of our world and thus
inadequate in its attempts to fully elucidate the world. 
Wittgenstein’s sketches of landscapes are consequently restless
attempts to reckon with a far less logical world than the one the
Tractatus imagined.  Just as certainty can effectively be
demoted to a “tone of voice,” our willful imposition of our logic
over the world is best replaced by the painstaking process of
reckoning with all manner of external contingency.[22]  The
impenetrability that Wittgenstein’s sketches are often charged
with belongs as much to them as it does to their very object of
study.
The notion of fragmentarity I discussed above about architecture
is fully applicable to Wittgenstein’s sketches. Like Libeskind,
Wittgenstein managed to create tangible edifices that rely
equally on structure (the landscape) and on fragment (the
sketch).  The world of books like Philosophical Investigations and
On Certainty at all times retains the first-personal dimension so
typical of Libeskind, but it is also as dialogical in its demands on
the reader as Libeskind’s written and built works are.[23]   With
Wittgenstein, the autobiographical manifests itself through both
direct and veiled references to his life but also, and much more
frequently, through the compulsive use of wild examples and
mental associations.[24]  In his book Mysticism and
Architecture:  Wittgenstein and the Meanings of the Palais
Stonborough, Roger Paden argued about the biographical and its
place in Wittgenstein’s later work.[25]  Paden stated that the
autobiographical dimension is not only easy to detect in the
works themselves but was also openly embraced by their author.
 In fact, on the evidence Paden provided, Wittgenstein seems to
have seen his philosophical inquiry as inextricably connected to
his life.[26]  
Paden was also interested in the particular ways in which
Wittgenstein’s scholarly work drew from his life and vice versa. 
The main example here is the embattled connection between
Wittgenstein’s first-hand experience as an architect and his work
in philosophy.  Paden recognized two different camps amongst
Wittgenstein scholars:  those who see the Palais Stonborough as
a three-dimensional variant of the Tractatus, one which
Wittgenstein’s sister Hermine tellingly called a “house turned
logic,” and those, like Anders Munch and Nana Last, who prefer
to reverse the causal order and look at the house Wittgenstein
built as a bridge “from the linguistic essentialism of the
Tractatus toward the pluralism of the Investigations.”[27]  Both
can be substantiated with compelling examples.  It is as likely
that the stern, mathematical order of the Tractatus was
stylistically influential on a house of right angles and punishing
symmetries as it is that the very experience of building it may
have inspired the paragraphs on the builders’ language game in
the beginning of the Investigations.  Ultimately, whichever
direction one favors or whatever reconciliation one seeks, it is
clear that Wittgenstein’s scholarly endeavors are often readable
into his personal life and vice versa.    
All of this is not to say that the connections between
Wittgenstein’s fragments and his life are anywhere immediately
available.  In fact, it is often even hard to sort out the
connections between the fragments themselves.  The formal and
substantive subversion of linearity that accounts for the divided
reception of Libeskind’s fragments is almost equally present in
Wittgenstein’s fragments.  When, for example, in Philosophical
Investigations, § 568, Wittgenstein inserted the statement
“meaning is a physiognomy,” he placed it under the core
paragraph in a double parenthesis. The reader barely needs the
punctuation signs to notice that the statement has no direct
bearing on anything that comes before and after it.  A similarly
disconnected fragment appears amongst a cluster of paragraphs
in On Certainty devoted to a discussion of doubt.  The fragment
in question reads, “Any ‘reasonable’ person behaves like
this.”[28]  It is only through having read the rest of the book,
outside the scope of the paragraphs on doubt, that one can
begin to understand this interjection.  But still, the very need for
an interjection of any import reveals Wittgenstein’s preference
for what Avrum Stroll aptly called “the broken text” over
traditional linear exposition.[29]
Wittgenstein’s broken text, quite like Libeskind’s architectural
equivalent, invites arbitrariness amidst perpetual attempts at
articulation.  The accidental element, however, seems to be
equally mandated by design and by necessity.  As Wittgenstein
explained in his Preface to the Investigations, the multi-
directional remarks he compiled are “connected with the very
nature of the investigation.”[30]  On the evidence of the book
as a whole, the investigation in question is nothing less than an
attempt to decipher the world through narrative instantiation
and questioning.  In this, the reader’s role is assumed to be an
active stance of immersion rather than a passive one of
apprenticeship.  In a passage that addresses our predicament in
reading Wittgenstein, Peter Hughes cautioned against the
common-sense assumption that Wittgenstein is “trying and
failing to write a systematic treatise.”  If the reader assumes
this, he or she “would become rather like the traveler in a
strange country (the example is Wittgenstein’s) who assumed he
was looking at fragments and rubble because he had not
encountered the sculptural convention of busts, the architectural
convention of ruins.”[31]  As I hope I have shown,
Wittgenstein’s fragments are necessary for the conveyance of a
certain non-linear, topographic unity.  The equivalent feat in
architecture is the high probability that, as we speak, Libeskind’s
fragments are rewriting the conventions of how we will
experience ruins in the future.
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Endnotes 
[1] In his essay, “Philosophy and the Task of Architecture,”
Karsten Harries exposes the challenge at hand in the following
way:  “But what does philosophy have to do with architectural
concerns?  The question leads to another: what is philosophy?
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote that
philosophical problems have the form ‘I don’t know my way
about.’  Of course, not all problems having that form are
therefore philosophical, for example,—e.g.  to have lost one’s
way in some strange city hardly suffices to make one a
philosopher; nor does not understanding some new
technology.”  (Karsten Harries, “Philosophy and the Task of
Architecture,” Journal of Architectural Education (1984-) Vol. 40,
No. 2, Jubilee Issue, Winter, 1987, 29-30.)
[2] A recent entry on Schlegel in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy explained the role of the philosophical fragment in
the following way:  “For Schlegel, a fragment as a particular has
a certain unity (“[a] fragment, like a small work of art, has to
be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete
in itself like a hedgehog,” Athenaeumsfragment 206), but
remains nonetheless fragmentary in the perspective it opens up
and in its opposition to other fragments.  Its “unity” thus reflects
Schlegel’s view of the whole of things not as a totality but rather
as a “chaotic universality” of infinite opposing stances.”  (Allen
Speight, “Friedrich Schlegel,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/schlegel/.)
[3] An aphorism is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as
“a concise statement of a principle; a terse formulation of a
truth or sentiment.”  The definitive trait of an aphorism is its
structural and conceptual insularity from a whole or a context of
any sort.  An aphorism can also be said to exhaust the need for
further explanation, cross-referencing, and so on.   
[4] In his essay “The Dislocation of the Architectural Self,” David
Goldblatt identified Eisenman’s method as textual architecture. 
Apart from throwing light on Libeskind’s possible debt to his
mentor, this concept announced the ascent of a new
architectural condition:  “Such a textual arbiter may even be
selected more or less at random and not itself really the product
of the will of the selector.  This needs certain qualification, but
means that although the selector does not know the full
consequences of the text for the architectural project
beforehand, he or she is nevertheless willing to accept those
consequences even if they violate the architect’s good,
traditional sense:  his or her tastes or preferences or those
characteristics such as function or harmony, which are
traditionally understood to constitute essential architectural
conditions.”  (David Goldblatt, “The Dislocation of the
Architectural Self,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,
Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1991), 344.)
[5] “It is to such universal pronouncements and to writers
peripheral to architecture, such as Jacques Derrida or Jean-
Francois Lyotard that many contemporary architectural
commentators turn for reference, rather than to the built
product.  The irony is that much of this writing is done by
architects or those working within architectural education. 
Surely they, more than anyone, are best equipped to address
the building rather than the text?  Complex structures, such as
Libeskind’s Jewish Museum in Berlin, might beg some
explanation beyond the emotive if simplistic concepts upon
which they are apparently based.”  (Neil Jackson, “Where Now
the Architect?” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,
Sixth Series, Vol. 13 (2003), 208-9.)
[6] Ibid., p. 217.
[7] “Unity and fragmentation are the two major contrasted
modes of twentieth-century composition in architecture as well
as painting.  A classic dialectic pair, married and bickering, they
are unable to carry on without each other.  The Chamberworks
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